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NOTE AND COMMENT
DEEDS DELIVERED CONDITIONALLY TO THE GRANT-.--Generally courts have
shown a commendable disposition to get away from the formalism, which in
the past played such a large part in determination of questions of delivery.
While the actual tradition of the instrument to the grantee or to someone
on his behalf, on the one hand, or its retention in the hands of the maker,
on the other, is still very important evidentially, such facts are not by any
means controlling. Thus it is entirely possible for a deed to be delivered
though it never has been out of the grantor's hands; likewise a deed may
be undelivered though in the hands of the grantee by the voluntary act of
the grantor. See the discussion by Professor Tiffany ir I7 MCHc. L. Rv. 1o4,
et seq., citing many cases. This result has come from the growing appre-
ciation by the courts that delivery after all is simply the manifestation of the
grantor's intent that, as to him, the instrument is a completed legal act.
This intent is normally shown by a handing over of the deed to the grantee
or to someone- for him, but there are other ways of showing such intent.
A deed in the hands of the grantor prima fade has been delivered; if in the
hands of the grantor, prima facie, it has not been delivered.
NOTE AND COMMENT 315
It is, however, remarkable that in certain types 
of cases there is adher-
ence to the old, formalistic idea that the conclusions 
referred to above as
prima facie are conclusive. This is especially striking 
in those cases where
a deed is handed to the grantee to become 
final and operative only on the
happening of an event or the performance 
of some condition. In Whyd-
don's Case, Cro. Eliz. 520, decided in i596 by 
the Court of Common Pleas,
and in Williams v. Green, Cro. Eliz. 884, by 
the same court in x602, it was
held that "the delivery of a deed cannot be averred 
to be to the party himself
as an escrow." The contrary was held by 
the Queen's Bench in i6oi in
Hawksland v. Gatchel, Cro. Eliz. 835. While it 
cannot be said that the
English courts have repudiated Whyddon's Case, 
there are reasons for think-
ing that when the question comes up squarely 
for decision the doctrine of
Hawksland v. Gatchel will be followed. See Murray 
v. Earl of Stair, 2 B. &
C. 82; Watkins v. Nash, L. R. 2o Eq. 262; London 
Freehold & Leasehold
Property Co. v. Suffield, (1897) 2 Ch. 6o8.
In this country the courts very generally have 
approved of Whyddon'
Case, even the mLst recent decisions. Weber v. Christen, 
121 Ill. 9; Wilson
V. Jenks. 63 Ind. App. 6x5; Hriple
fr v. Wipfler. 153 Mich. x8; Hamlin v. Ham-
lin, 192 N. Y. i64;.Chaudoir v. Witt, (Wis. igxg) 
174 N. W. 925. The reas-
oning underlying these holdings, when any is disclosed 
by the opinion, is
shown by the following from the opinion of Gray, J. in Hamlin 
v. Hamlin,
supra: "If we should give full effect to the plaintiff's 
claim, it would be to
hold the delivery by her of the deeds to have been conditioned 
and not abso-
lute; but that would be violative of the settled rule 
in this state that a de-
livery cannot be made to the grantee conditionally. 
Any oral condition ac-
companying the delivery, in such case, would be repugnant 
to the terms of
the deed and parol evidence to prove that there was 
such a condition attached
to the delivery is inadmissible. The reason for the rule 
applies to every case
where the delivery is intended to give effect to a deed 
without the further
act of the grantor and such was this case * * * These 
deeds had passed out
of the plaintiff's possession and into that of the grantee, 
by the deliberate
act of the former, and no oral condition, at the time, 
will be admitted to
contradict the import of the written instruments." In short, the trouble 
is,
as these courts view it, that the admission of parol evidence 
to show the
condition is to violate the parol evidence rule.
In his celebrated work on Evidence Dean Wigmore has pointed 
out with
characteristic clearness the true nature of the so-called 
Parol Evidence Rule.
4 WIGwoRZ o2 EvIDENcS, § 24oo, et seq. The 
matter here under consider-
ation involves that part of the Rule 'dealing with the "enaction, or creation,
of the act." Parol evidence is almost invariably admissible 
to show that no
legal act has been consummated. Ibid. § 24o8. In Curry 
v. Colburn, 99 Wis.
319, it was held that a grantor could show that his 
deed, which was complete
on its face, had been handed to the &rantee only for the 
purpose of taking
it to an attorney for examination. See, too, Sample v. Greathard, 
281 Ill. 79.
Yet both these courts hold that a grantor will not be permitted 
to show by
parol that a deed handed to the grantee was to become operative 
only on the
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happening of an event. In Wilson v. Powers, T31 Mass. 539, in an action on apromissory note it was held permissible to show that the note had been
handed to the payee to take effect only on the performance of a condition.
Devens, J., said: "The manual delivery of an instrument may always beproved to have been on a condition which has not been fulfilled in order to
avoid its effect." In truth it seems that with reference to instruments other
than deeds of conveyance such facts may be proved. See Pyrn v. Campbell,
6 E. & B. 370; 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCS, § 241o. There seems to be here a
striking instance of a survival of a formalistic* doctrine (explained by the
relation between delivery of deeds of conveyance and primitive modes of
conveyance) regarding which English courts have shown a more enlightened
view than have courts on this side. Indeed this is characteristic of the
attitudes of the courts in the two countries regarding the law of Real Prop-
erty, generally.
Reference should be made to Lee v. Richmond, 9o Iowa 696, where the
rule of Whyddon's Case was not applied. R. W. A.
LIABILITY WITHOUT FAuLT.-In Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 2ox N. Y.271, appeared, as a basis for the decision, the statement that "When our
Constitutions were adopted, it was the law of the land that no man who was
without fault or negligence could be held liable in damages for injuries
sustained by another. That is still the law." Mr. Justice McKenna has re-
cently voiced the same idea. In his dissenting opinion in Arizona Copper
Co. v. Hammer, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 553, he contends that the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act of Arizona is unconstitutional, because, "It seems to me to beof the very foundation of right-of the essence of liberty as it is of morals-
to be free from liability if one is free from fault." Even the majority of the
court seemed inclined to justify their decision, that the Act was constitutional,
by the argument that, as the liability under it would be known in advance,
employers could protect themselves by "reducing wages and increasing the
se!ling price of the product, in order to allow for the statutory liability."
The fallacy of this proposition, as a principle of the Common Law, has
been several times pointed out. One type of case, however, in which liabil-
ity without fault not only exists, but is constantly being enlarged, seems tohave been ignored. By the Common Law there is imposed upon sellers of
goods, in certain instances, a liability of which they are not notified and
which has no relation whatever to fault or free will on their part.
These are the cases in which sellers of goods are held to be' absolute in-surers of the harmlessness thereof. In Parks v. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334,
for instance, the plaintiff had been poisoned by some deleterious substance in
a pie which he had bought from a retail dealer. There was no vrivity of
contract with the defendant, but the latter, as a manufacturer, had made the
pie and sold it to the intermediate dealer. The action for damages was in
tort. There was absolutely no evidence of fault on the defendant's part
even offered, beyond the facts stated. Nevertheless, the court held that the
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defendant was liable, on the ground that "A manufacturer or dealer who puts
human food upon the market for sale or for immediate consumption does
so upon an implied representation that it is wholesome for human consump-
tion. Practically he must know it is fit or take the consequences." In 
Jack-
son v. Coca Cola Co., (Miss.) 64 So. 791, one who was a bottler 
of soft
drinks was held liable for injury to one who drank thereof, 
although there
was no contract between him and the plaintiff and although 
no evidence ot
his negligence was given, on the ground that he was "under 
a legal duty"
to see that no one was injured by foreign substances in his 
product.
An even more obvious type of extraneously imposed liability 
is found in
those cases where the liability was founded originally on 
free will-that is
to say, where a seller is held liable-as a "warrantor." The 
original basis of
this liability seems to have been that of misrepresentation 
and deceit. AmZs,
HisToRY or AssuMPsIT. 2 HARv. LAW Rtv. 8. It has long 
been treated, how-
ever, as a contractual liability. In this theory, at first, the 
element oi intent
on the seller's part to assume a liability was considered 
essential. In some
cases it is held that the intent must expressly appear, as by 
use of the word
"warrant." Chandler v. Lopus, Cro. Jac. 4, discussed by Mr. Ames, 2 HAXv.
LAW Rzv. 9; De Sewhenberg v. Buchanan, 5 Car. & P. 
343. In others it is
held that it must at least be clearly implied in fact. Borrekin 
v. Bevan, 3"
Rawle (Pa.) 23; Henson v. King, 3 Jones (N. C.) 419; Coats 
v. Hord,
x.5 Pac. 40. But at present the tendency is to ignore 
all thought of real
intention on the seller's part and to "imply" a liability 
as a matter of law
from the mere act of sale. Thus, in Chapman v. Roggenkamp, 
182 Ill. App.
117, the defendant had sold a can of peas to plaintiff. There 
was some sort
of toxin in the peas and the buyer was made violently sick. 
He -sued the
seller in damages on the theory of an implied warranty. The 
sale was the
ordinary grocery store transaction and there was nothing to indicate 
inten-
tional or conscious assumptior of liability of any sort by the seller. 
Further-
more, he had not himself canned the peas, but had bought them from 
a well
reputed packing house. He had no more knowledge of the contents of 
the
can than the buyer, the plaintiff, had, and could not in any sense have 
been
said to be at fault. Yet, despite this absence of either intent to 
assume
a liability, or fault of any sort. on the defendant's part. he was held 
liable
in damages. The same result was reached in Ward v. Great Atlantic 
and
Pacic Tea Co., 23t Mass. go, where the defendant, a grocer, sold, in 
the usual
way, a can of beans which he had bought from a well known wholesaler
who used all modem and proper methods in the packing process. The 
defend-
ant was wholly without actual fault, and, of course, without 
knowledge of
anything wrong with the beans. The buyer broke a tooth on a stone 
that
was with the beans and was allowed to recover damages from the 
seller. The
decision was based upon a section of the Sales Act, but the court 
expressly
said that the section was but a codification of the Common Law. See also,
Sloan v. F. W. Woolworth Co.. 103 Ill. App. 62o. In the most recent 
decision,
Carnavan v. City of Mechanicsville, 177 N. Y. S. 8o8. decided coincidently
with the statement of Mr. Justice McKenna quoted above, this absolute 
liabil-
ity. as. a matter of law, rather than of real intention, was extended to 
those
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who sell water for household purposes. The defendant was held liable, on
an implied warranty of wholesomeness, regardless of any negligence on its
part, because the plaintiff had contracted typhoid fever from the water which
its municipal waterworks had furnished.
The reason given for these holdings bases them squarely, not on zny real
assumption of liability, but on a liability imposed by law as a matter of public
policy. In Jackson v. Watson & Sons, [I9o91 2 K. B. i03, it was said by
Vaughn Williams, L. J., that the cause of action, whether in form of tort or
of contract arose out of a duty following the relation of the parties.
Should Mr. Justice McKenna ever desire to withdraw from his position
in the Arizona Copper Co. case, without the appearance of having reversed
himself, he might say boldly, on the precedent of Parks v. Yost Pie Co.,
"Practically, an employer must know his employment is safe. or take the
consequences." Or he might say, more euphemistically but none the less
legitimately, "In every contract of employment there is, if public policy so
requires, an implied warranty that the work is safe." J. B. W.
CONTRACTS FOR TH1 BSNEFIT OF A THIRD PERSON IN MICHIGAN.-In the
recent case of Preston v. Preston the supreme court of Michigan had occasion
to consider the question as to whether or not one for whose benefit a contract
is made has any enforcible rights. The suit was one 'in Chancery, the donee
plaintiff was an invalid, and every consideration of justice and equity de-
manded that she be given relief. The court had, however, to face the fact
that in recent cases it had indicated its opinion to be that the third party
beneficiary has no rights. In Modern Maccabees v. Sharp, (igio) 163 Mich.
449, 456 the court speaking through the late Justice Ostrander had said, "The
general rule in this state is regarded as settled. I see no reason for saying
that it is not the same in proceedings at law and in equity." Again in In re
Bush's Estate. (oi7) io9 Mich. 102, x96. Justice Kuhn, the writer of the
opinion in the principal case, had said, "No serious claim is made that a
promise made by one person to another for the benefit of a third-a stranger
to the consideration-will support an action by the latter according to the
law of this state." And at page x9, "But the situation before us is not
merely a question of ajplying the remedy to the rights of the parties, but
under the law as it existed at the time this claim was filed, the claimant had
no rights arising out of the transaction against the defending estate."
The court in its first opinion in the case, reported at 205 Mich. 646, took
the position that the rule -as above announced had been so far changed by
Sec. io, Chap. 12, Act No. 314, Pub. Acts 1915 (3 MICH. Corn'. LAWS 1915,
§ 12361) as to enable the donee beneficiary to maintain a suit in equity on
the promise made for her benefit. That this view is untenable was shown in
a note in a recent number of this review (18 MICH. L. Rzv. s8) wherein the
hope was expressed that a more satisfactory basis might be found for the
holding. On rehearing, in an opinion recently filed but not yet reported, the
court receded from the position originally taken and now supports its judg-
ment on entirely different grounds. From a reconsideration of the evidence
in the case it now finds as a fact that the promise was made directly to the
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plaintiff, although the consideration was furnished by plaintiff's mother who,
according to the original finding, was the sole promisee. As a result of this
interpretation of the evidence the court concludes that the plaintiff is a privy
to the contract and as such entitled to maintain the suit on the ground that
this is an exception to the rule denying a right of action to one for whose
ben-Jit a contract is made. (i75 N. W. 266.)
It is quite obvious that the court in its conclusion has confused two
questions which are essentially different. If the plaintiff was a party to the
contract-a promisee--,as the court finds, then the case is not one involving
a contract for the benefit of a third person at all in the sense in which that
phrase is commonly employed, and it simply makes confusion worse con-
founded to say that it is an exception to the general rule. There is under
these circumstances no want of privity in the plaintiff-the usual ground for
denying relief in third party cases-and the only question involved is whether
or not a party to a contract may enforce a promise made to him, the con-
sideration for which was furnished by another. This question has always
been answered in the affirmative in Michigan, both at law and in equity,
and it has never been asserted that this holding at all conflicts with the rule
denying the right of a third party beneficiary. Monaghan y. Agricultural
Fire Ins. Co., 53 Mich. 238; Clark v. Clark, 134 Mich. 6o2 (semble) ; Palmer
v. Bray, 136 Mich. 85. This is in accord with the generally prevailing rule in
this country. Van Eman v. Stanchfield, xo Minn. 255; Rector v. Teed, 120
N. Y. 583; Palmer Savings Bank v. Ins. Co., 166 Mass. i89; Williamson v.
Yager, oi Ky. 282. Contra: Dunlop v. Selfridge, (1915] A. C. 847.
In view of the evident uncertainty in regard to the third party's rights it
may be worth while to try to determine just what has been decided by the
court. Where the action was one at law for breach of promise, the uniform
holding has been that the third party has no enforcible rights, and this is
true as well in the case of a sole or donee beneficiary as in the case of a
creditor beneficiary. Pipp v. Reynolds, 2o Mich.-88; Turner v. McCarty, 22
Mich. 264; Halsted v. Francis, 31 Mich. 112, Hicks v. McGarry, 38 Mich.
667; Hidden v. Chappel, 48 Mich. 527; Edwards v. Clement, 8r Mich. 5r3;
Wheeler v. Stewart, 94 Mich. 445; Linneman v. M'oross, 98 Mich. 178; Signs
v. Bush Estate, z99 Mich. 192. But where the defendant has received specific
funds to be delivered to the third party, it is held the latter may enforce the
obligation in general assumpsit. Fay v. Anderson, 48 Mich- 259. It has also
been held that a sole beneficiary to whom the promisee his assigned his
rights under the contract may enforce the claim at law as assignee, and it is
intimated that he may recover substantial damages. Ebel v. Pichl, 134 Mich.
64. Such a result would, however, be difficult to justify in view of the fact
that the ordinary rule would limit the recovery in such a case to nominal
damages. See Burbank v. Gould, is Me. m8; Adams v. Union R. R. Co..
21 R. I. z34. Search has failed to disclose any suit in Chancery brought by
the beneficiary, except that of a mortgagee beneficiary to be mentioned later,
in which a decision of this question was necessary to dispose of the case.
Modern Maccabees v. Sharp, supra. is not an exception to this statement for
the reason that in that case the court apparently found as a fact that the
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promise sued on had not been made. See head note to the case. Assuming
the alleged promise to have been made, it was clearly one which would
only incidentally have benefitted the plaintiff and cannot therefore be said to
have been made for his benefit. The court has, however, frequently ex-
pressed the opinion obiter either that relief in equity would be granted to
the beneficiary or that the question is still an open one. See Linneman v.
Moross, 9 Mich. 178; Clare v. Warner, io6 Mich. 695; Palmer. v. Bray, 136
Mich. 85. In Peer v. Kean, 14 Mich. 354, where A contracted with B on a
consideration furnished by the latter to build a ship and on its completion to
convey a one-half interest to B's wife upon payment by her of certain
charges, the court granted specific performance of the promise at the suit
of B, the promisee. Whether the same relief would have been granted at
the suit of the wife was not indicated. The mortgagee beneficiary has always
been granted relief in equity as against the grantee of the mortgaged premises
who assumed the mortgage, but whether on the theory of subrogation or by
reason of a statute (CoMP. L. 1915 § i268o) the court has not always defi-
nitely indicated. Crawford v. Edwards, 33 Mich. 353; Miller v. Thompson,
34 Mich. 9; Corning v. Burton, 1o2 Mich. 86.
It is quite clear that the third party, at any rate where he is a sole or
donee beneficiary, ought to be given relief. The cases show that parents as
well as others frequently make provision in this way for those dependent
upon their bounty. To deny the latter a remedy is to enrich the unscrupulous
at the expense of the needy. While the rule of stare decis probably precludes
the giving of relief in an action at law, the question is apparently still an
open one in equity, and relief in the nature of specific perfrnrmance would
not seem t be inconsistent with equitable principles. Such a holding would
make it unnecessary to strain the facts to do jdstice in a particular case.
Perhaps legislative action on the matter would not be untimely. G. C. G.
PUBLIC UTILITIZS-FRANCHISz RATmS AS Ap scT. BY TnZ WORLD WAR.-
The economic convulsions due to the World War are abundantly reflected
in the relations between the public and their public utilities operating under
franchises fixing rates for service. The enormous rise in cost of labor and
materials has, in many cases, so reduced the net income of such utilities as
to make it a negative quantity at existing franchise rates. The utilities are
crying to be saved from bankruptcy, but the unfortunate suspicion bred by
past dealings of many such companies has made the public skeptical, and
perhaps in many cases entirely unreasonable. In some cases plain selfish-
ness may explain the attitude on both sides. The Supreme Court of the
United States has recently held that a contract is still a contract, notwith-
standing the critical conditions caused by the war. Columbus Ry. P. & L.
Co. v. Columbus, (U. S. i919) 39 Sup. Ct. 349, (see 17 MIcE. L. Rzv. 689),
followed in Michigan Ry. Co. v. Lansing, (ig9g) 26o Fed. 322. Though the
German steamship company may have been justified in turning back and fail-
ing to carry out its contract to deliver at Plymouth and Cherbourg gold
shipped on the Kronprinzessin Cecilie, since the imminent danger of capture
by a belligerent which would have ended possibility of performance excused
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performance entirely, Kronprinzessin Cecilie, 244 U. S. 13, yet this does not
affect the general principle "that if a party charge himself with an obligation
possible to be performed he must abde by it. unless performance is rendered
impossible by the act of God, the law, or the other party. Unforeseen diffi-
culties will not excuse performance." lb. The very essence of a contract is
that the contractor takes the risk within the limits of his undertaking. Day
v. U. S., 245 U. S. i59; North Hempstead v. Pub. Serv. Corp., 176 N. Y. S.
621. The courts cannot relieve nor make new contracts for the parties.
Muscatine Lighting Co. v. Muscatine, (1019) 256 Fed. 928.
In the Columbus case the terms of the franchise were clear, the fare to
be charged was explicitly stated, there was no room for interpretation.
Though the War Labor Board had granted a fifty per cent increase in wages
to the employees of the company, yet this was not an intervention by the
government as in Metropolitan Water Board v. Dick, Kerr & Co., [1918] A.
C. 119. A rise in the cost of labor is one of the risks. Indeed it is not
shown that the franchise would be unprofitable for the whole 25 years period.
Would it make a difference if it were shown? The company, then, could
not throw up its franchise and ask the aid of a court of equity to relieve it
from its hard bargain. The city, acting under state authority, had made the
contract and was bound by it. Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 2o6
U. S. 496. Can it be supposed that the company would have revised the
bargain in favor of the city if the advantages had been reversed? The com-
pany must be held equally bound though temporarily at least, the operation
of the lines must result in a loss. The remedy, if any be needed, addresses
itself to the duly constituted authorities. See also Moorhead v. Union L. H.
& P. Co.,'(x918) 255 Fed. 92o; Hillsdale Gaslight Co. v. Hillsdale, (i919)
258 Fed. 485.
During 1919 many rate disputes growing out of this high operating cost
have come to the couxts of last resort. Some may be noted which involve
contracts between the utility and the municipality which granted the fran-
chise to operate. In 17 Mxcn. L. Rgv. 429 attention was called to the un-
pleasant surprise the public was having in discovering that franchise rates
which had been upheld as fixed and binding against the public when in
favor of the utilities, were no longer fixed, but subject to revision up-
ward now that they were unprofitable and ruinous to the utilities. The
utilities have cried for relief to the public utilities commissions, the people's
own boards, and their cry is being heard, for experience shows that such
commissions are much more likely than the local authorities to grant at
least emergency relief. State v. Lewis, (Ind., xg18) 12o N. E. x2g; Otlumwa
Ry. & Light Co. v. Ottumwa. (Ia..,iQi9) 173 N. W. 270.
That a franchise between a municipality acting within its powers and
a utility corporation is a binding contract is still undoubted, law, North
Hempsteaa v. Pub. Serv. Corp. 176 N. Y. S. 621; Cleveland v. Cleveland City
Ry. Co., 194 0. S. 517; Interurban Ry. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Coin., (Ohio,
1918) i2o N. E. 831; Muscatine Lighting Co. v. Muscatine, (xgig) 256 Fed.
929; Hillsdale Gaslight Co. v. Hillsdale, (1gg) 258 Fed. 485, but it is be-
322 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
coming much clearer how often the city in assuming to fix rates has acted
without proper legislative authorization, Otturnwa Ry. & Light Co. v. Ot-
iurnwa, supra; Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Railroad Cons., (Ga., i9i9)
98 S. E. 696; KalamazoQ v. Circuit Judge, (1918) 200 Mich. 146; San Air-
tonjo Public Serv. Co. v. San Antonio, (1919) 257 Fed. 467; Atlanta v.
Atlanta Gaslight Co., (Ga. igig) zoo S. E. 439; Winchester v. Winchester
Waterworks Co., (U. S. Adv. Ops., Jan. 5, i92O), and that such rates when
lawfully fixed are always subject to the police power of the state, which
cannot be surrendered, Koehn v. Pub. Serv. Corn., (gig) 176 N. Y. S. 147;
St. Louis v. Pub. Serv.. Co., (Mo., i918) 2o7 S. W. 799; Atlantic Coast
Electric Ry. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Coi., (N. J., 1918) io4 At. 218; Inter-
urban Ry. Ca. v. Pub. Utilities Coin., (Ohio. ioi8) 12o N. E. 831; Salt Lake
City v. Utah Light & Traction Co., (Utah, 1918) 173 Pac. 556; Georgia Ry.
& Power Co. v. Railroad Corn., (Ga., i9i9) 98 S.. E. 696, and hence that in
all cases except where the people have restrained the legislature in the con-
stitution the rates fixed in the franchise, and which are binding as against
the city, may be raised by the legislature, Interurban Ry. Co. v. Puo. Utilities
Coin., supra, or by a public commission to which the legislature has clearly
committed such-.power. Koehn v. Pub. Serv. Cor., (i919) 176 N. Y. S.
147; State v. Lewis. (Ind., ioi8) i2o N. E. iso. This is nothing more than
to say that when the state through one of its minor subdivisions has made
a binding contract it has the power, with or without the consent of such
subdivision, to release the other party to the contract, even though it may
be admitted the other party would not release the state if the conditions
were reversed. This it does, not out of generosity, but because it regards
it as good public policy to have its public utilities in good financial con-
dition so as to insure good service. Just why the locality" more immediately
affected does not usually take this view of it is a study in psychology or
sociology rather than in law. Most of the cases show the cities trying to
prevent the commissions from hearing the cry of the utility, or granting relief.
Koehn v. Pub. Serv. Co., supra; Atlantic Coast Electric Railway Co. v. Pub.
Utility Co., (N. J., 1918) io4 AtI. 218; Salt Lake City v. Utah Light & Trac-
tion Co.. (Utah. m0x8) 173 Pac. .56; Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Railroad
Corn., (Ga., i919) 98 S. E. 696.
Such wad the case of International Ry. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Corn., (ig9g) z26
N. Y. 474, which well illustrates how since 1917 the shoe pinches the foot of
the other wearer, and the city after putting it on is struggling to kick it off,
while the utility after trying to keep out of it is now eager to get in. In 1916
the city of Buffalo. claiming that the permitted fare was too high, petitioned
the Public Service Commission to fix a just and reasonable rate. For two
years the petition lay dormant. Then the company, claiming it was no longer
a question of lower rates, but a choice between higher rates and bankruptcy,
joined the now unwilling city in its forgotten prayer for a revision. The
Commission, siding with the city, refused to accept the unwelcome and long
delayed answer, but the Court of Appeals found the Commission must hear
the case. In Matter of Quinby v. Public Serv. Coin., 223 N. Y. 244, the court
NOTE AND COMMENT
had held that in the absence of clear and definite language it would not be
assumed that the legislature had authorized the commission to annul con-
ditions imposed by local authorities, but the conditions in the Buffalo fran-
chise necessarily implied an agreement for revisions. The New York con.
stitution, like that of many other states, e. g., Missouri, St. Louis v. Pub.
Serv. CoM., 207 S. W. 799; and Utah, Salt Lake City v. Utah Light and Trac-
tion Co., 173 Pac. 556, forbids the construction or operation of a street rail-
road without the consent of the local authorities first obtained. This means
the consent may be conditioned on charging a named rate of fare, but it does
not remove beyond the control of the legislature in the exercise of its police
power a revision of the rate so agreed upon. People ex rel. Glen Falls v.
Pub. Serv. Cor., 225 N. Y. 216. Whether the municipality might revoke its
consent if the legislature should raise the rate was left open in that case, and
again in the recent case of International Ry. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Com., 226 N.
Y. 474, but apparently the New York Legislature has given to the Commis-
sion all the power it had over rates not already fixed by statute, Niagara Falls
v. Pub. Ser. Com.. 177 N. Y. S. 861 (Sept:. i10x). or by legislative sanction
equivalent to a statute, Quinby v. Pub. Ser,. Com., 223 N. Y. 244; Koehn v.
Pub. Serv. Corn., x76 N. Y. S. 147. In those cases even though the statutory
rate might be confiscatory the Commission is not endowed with power to
so adjudge. They are outside its jurisdictioni. People ex rel. Gas Co. of
Albany v. Pub. Seer. Com., 224 N. Y. 156. Compare Maine cases appearing
since this note was written: In re Guilford Water Co's. Rates, io8 Atl. 446;
In re Searsport Water Co., Ibid. 452; In re Island Falls Water Co., Ibid. 459.
There is no longer any doubt that in general as against the municipality
reasonable rates fixed by contract between the municipality and the utility
are liable to be superceded by rates fixed by the legislature in the exercise
of its police power, or by a commission under legislative authority clearly
conferred. Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Corp., 248 U. S.
372 (1919). From this it often results that franchise rates cannot be changed
as against the utility, because it would amount to impairingthe obligation of a
contract, but they may be changed by the legislature as against the munici-
pality because the municipality is a subordinate division of the stAte and is
always subject to the legislative power, except as restrained by the con-
stitution. Interurban Ry. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Corn., (Ohio, 9I18) 12o N. E.
831; Salt Lake City v. Utah Light & Traction Co., (Utah, sgi8) 173 Pac.
556; Englewovd v. Denver & So. Platt Ry. Co.. 248 U. S. 294 (iig), followed
in Black v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., (La., xgig) 82 So. 81, refusing
remedy in such a case to a citizen taxpayer; State v. Lewis, (Ind., 1918) 120
N. E. i29. But certainly if the statutes leave with the municipalities the
power to fix rates they may enter into mutually binding contracts with refer.
ence thereto, and a recent case holds that- when such a contract is once entered
into the city as well as the company is protected against a change even by the
legislature by reason of the Federal Constitutional prohibition against any
state passing a law impairing the obligation of a contract. Cincinnati v.
Pub. Utility Com. (Ohio, i9x8) 121 N. E. 688. As to the municipality this
may be doubted, and Jones, J., in dissenting points out that municipalities
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are political subdivisions of the state, and mere agents subject to the power
of the state to change its regulations. It would seem that only a constitu-
tional provision could restrain the legislature. State v. Lewis, (Ind., 1918)
12o N. E. 129; Westinghouse Electrical & Mfg. Co. v. Binghampton Ry. Co.,
(1919) 255 Fed. 378, 408. In such case it gets its power, not from the
legislature, but from the people and the municipality is then, of course, beyond
the reach of the legislature. Interurban Ry. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Corn., (Ohio,
i918) 120 N. R. 831.
What utilities will do that find themselves headed for bankruptcy and
denied increase over franchise rates does not fully appear. They may try
coercion by refusal to operate, as in Toledo and some other places, but so
far as the courts are concerned it seems clear they cannot grant relief, even
by establishing a receivership. The receiver must operate under the con-
tract. Westinghouse Electrical & Mfg. Co. v. Binghampton Ry. Co., supra.
North American Construction Co. v. Des Moines City Ry. Co., (1919) 256
Fed. r07, in which the court suggests that if it is a question of a raise in rates
or of a poorer service the class of service must yield rather than the rates.
But what right can there be to yield either? It may be bad public policy to
insist on such hard bargains against public utilities, but.public policy addresses
itself to the legislatures, not to the courts. Muescatine Light Co. v. Muscatine,
(ioig) 256 Fed. 929, Ottumwa Ry. & Light Co. v. Ottumwa, (Ia., 1919) I73
N. W. 27o. See also Pub. Utilities Com. v. Rhode Island Co., (R. I., 1919)
bo7 AtI. "87r, io8 Atl. 66, Michigan Ry. Co. v. Lansing, (i91g) 26o Fed. 322.
Both the utilities and the public should learn that their interests are largely
mutual, and that it may be neither just nor safe to insist on tak;ng all the
advantages of a hard bargain. No one can tell when conditions may reverse
advantages. . C. G.
